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This thesis examines the influence of video surveillance images on institutional 
practices.  The three institutions examined are police, private businesses and the courts.  
The research is theoretically grounded by the orienting concept of the surveillant 
assemblage.  The research found that the three institutions are influenced by the 
availability of video surveillance images.  Impacts included changes in workload and 
institutional restructuring.  Furthermore, institutions external to those examined also 
influenced the use of video surveillance images.  Each institution was found to use the 
video surveillance images for various purposes and to represent the images in particular 
ways to make use of the information provided.  The research has also contributed to the 
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 Within Western nations, video surveillance cameras1 have increasingly been 
deployed by both private organizations and government bodies to monitor a vast array of 
domains, including apartment complexes, retail establishments and public spaces (see 
Walby, 2005a; Webster, 2009).  The surveillance images2 created by video surveillance 
are visual and shape our understandings and engagement with crime, control, and social 
order (Greer et al., 2007: 5). Video surveillance images not only shape our 
understandings and engagement with crime but, as this research discusses, surveillance 
images also inform institutional practices. 
 This research seeks to contribute to understanding video surveillance and the 
surveillant assemblage.  Its purpose is to answer the overarching question: How do 
surveillance images, as visual information, influence institutional practices? Three 
institutions that use surveillance images were examined: businesses, police and the 
courts.  Interviews conducted with persons working within each institution and publicly 
available documents, including case law, municipal police budgets, Toronto Police press 
releases and video obtained from the Toronto Crime Stoppers YouTube channel were 
analyzed in this research.  This research project is important to help us better understand 
how surveillance images influence the practices of various institutions.  The orienting 
concept of the surveillant assemblage is used to theoretically ground the research (see 
Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; Hier, 2003; Ericson, 2007; Bogard, 2006; Hier and 
Greenberg, 2009; Lippert, 2009).  Multiple perspectives on information, knowledge and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Video surveillance cameras refer to a system that captures images and transfers these images to a location, 
or locations, where the images are accessed (in real-time and/or for future viewing).   
2 ‘Surveillance image’ refers to both still photographs and rolling video. 
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representation (see Tagg, 1988; Hayles, 1999; Brachman and Levesque, 2004) are also 























2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Surveillant Assemblage 
 Haggerty and Ericson (2000: 607) developed the orienting concept of the 
surveillant assemblage, using analytical tools created by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), to 
move beyond the concepts developed by Orwell (i.e., Big Brother) and Foucault (i.e., the 
panopticon) and expanded on by other researchers and theorists.  The surveillant 
assemblage works through a process of abstracting human bodies from their location and 
separating them into discrete flows of information that are then reassembled into data-
doubles.  Later, these data-doubles may become targets of intervention (Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2000: 604). Assemblages consist of an endless number of phenomena including, 
but not limited to, information and institutions (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 608).  
 Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari, the growth of the surveillant assemblage is 
described as rhizomatic.  This metaphor emphasizes the rapid growth of the surveillant 
assemblage and the leveling of hierarchies (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 614).  The 
growth of rhizomes occurs “across a series of interconnected roots which throw up shoots 
in different locations” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 614).  As opposed to hierarchical 
surveillance, this rhizomatic growth of surveillance allows for both those with and those 
without power to be scrutinized by institutions and the general public (Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2000: 617).  Mathiesen (1997) asserts that we live in the viewer society in 
which, through the process of synopticism, the many watch the few.  Synopticism does 
not create a complete leveling of the surveillance hierarchy, however, it highlights the 
point that no groups stand “above or outside of the surveillant assemblage” (Haggerty 
and Ericson, 2000: 618).    
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 Ericson (2007: 2) states that most crimes are not reported to police and that other 
institutions have the primary role of crime prevention.  These institutions rely on a 
precautionary logic, which is “the logic of uncertainty” (Ericson, 2007: 22).  The 
precautionary logic fuels suspicion and has enabled uncertainty to become a reason for 
preemptive measures that hold responsible, monitor and sanction designated persons 
(Ericson, 2007: 23).  The use of precautionary logic leads to criminalization through two 
types of counter-law: laws against law and the surveillant assemblage.  Both types of 
counter-law erode the traditional principles, standards and procedures of criminal law as 
a response to uncertainty (Ericson, 2007: 24-30).  That institutions external to the state 
have the primary role of crime prevention, using data-gathering technologies such as 
video surveillance, highlights the problems with both Foucaultian and Orwellian imagery 
which focus on these technologies within the state’s control (Hier and Greenberg, 2009: 
19).  Another consequence of the surveillant assemblage is function creep, which is the 
use of surveillance technologies “for purposes that were not originally intended” 
(Monahan, 2007: 378).  
Images, Information, Knowledge, and Representation 
To understand the processes involved in using surveillance images, and the ability 
of the surveillances image to influence institutional practices in this thesis I first 
distinguish among information, knowledge and representation. Information is raw data 
that in its technical form has no meaning (Hayles, 1999: 32).  Prior to it being examined 
(e.g., to monitor a suspected shoplifter, to be investigated by police) the surveillance 
image is information. When the surveillance image is studied or experienced and ideas 
are inferred or read into the image it becomes part of a knowledge base.  Knowledge is 
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the relation between a knower and a proposition (Brachman and Levesque, 2004: 2-3).  
For example, a police officer [the knower] knows that an assault was committed at a 
local pub [the proposition].  Representation is the relationship between two domains.  
The first domain symbolizes or replaces the other (Brachman and Levesque, 2004: 3-4).  
The surveillance image, including other knowledge attached to it, comes to stand for the 
criminal event (see for example Hay, 1995).  According to Tagg (1988: 4), “that a 
photograph can come to stand as evidence, for example, rests not on a natural or 
existential fact, but on a social, semiotic process” (emphasis in original).  In other words 
the value of the information provided by the surveillance image as evidence rests upon 
the representations of the image through a social process.  Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 
83-84) state that information and knowledge3 is that ‘‘which is objectified in institutional 
representations, a property and resource that provides a capacity for action’’ (Ericson and 
Haggerty, 1997: 83-84, emphasis added).  For action to be taken the image must come to 
stand for an event, person or object.   
 The primary form of information that is under consideration is the surveillance 
image.  According to Barthes (1981) we look at a photograph to see something else; we 
do not look at it for its own sake (see Biber, 2007).  The surveillance image, therefore, is 
not simply viewed for the sake of viewing but rather it is viewed to discover other 
information (e.g., a murder weapon or suspect’s clothing).  The surveillance camera 
merely “mechanically – unflinchingly – captures unguarded moments” (Biber, 2007: 21). 
However, through being developed, examined and scrutinized the images can be 
assembled into “an album of disorder and deviance” (Biber, 2007: 21).  These images 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For the purposes of this paper, information and knowledge are taken as separate concepts. 
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provide only the most obvious information, being what a particular subject looked like in 
a certain location at one given time.  All “other information needs to be coaxed out of 
them - or read into them”; the photograph is merely a tool that when used implies a 
variety of assumptions and philosophies (Phillips, 1997: 29).  These assumptions and 
philosophies inform how the surveillance images are represented.  The knowledge that is 
gained from surveillance images, and images in general, is “a knowledge at bargain 
prices – a semblance of knowledge, a semblance of wisdom; as the act of taking pictures 

















3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous research on video surveillance focused on public, or open-street, 
programs.  In particular, previous studies have examined the establishment of these 
programs (Hier et al., 2007: Walby, 2005b), the effectiveness of video surveillance 
programs (see, Brown, 1995; Welsh and Farrington, 2003; Gill and Spriggs 2005; 
Farrington, Gill, and Waples, 2007; Waples, Gill and Fisher, 2009) and privacy issues 
(for example see Ryberg, 2007; Lever, 2008; Goold, 2008; Ryberg, 2008).  Studies of 
open-street video surveillance are important due to both the amount of government 
funding given to these projects and the privacy concerns arising from their 
implementation. However, the examination of open-street video surveillance has been to 
the detriment of research on privately operated video surveillance.  Therefore, to address 
the gap in the literature, this current research focuses on privately owned and operated 
video surveillance and how surveillance images influence institutional practices, in 
particular how the implementation of private video surveillance has influenced the 
practices of businesses, police and the courts.  
 One institution that uses surveillance images and has been studied is the mass 
media.  Surveillance images of two-year-old James Bulger being lead away by two ten-
year-olds, who would later murder James, were used by the media to frame James’ 
abduction.  The surveillance images provided visual evidence that was important to the 
media’s portrayal of moral and social disintegration in the United Kingdom (Hay, 1995).  
The media have also used surveillance images in ‘reality’ programs such as Video 
Justice: Crime Caught on Tape (Biressi and Nunn, 2003).  Surveillance images have 
been used in the media-based program Crime Stoppers (Carriere and Ericson, 1989; 
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Lippert 2002; Lippert and Wilkinson, 2009). This previous research demonstrates the 
importance of surveillance images in depicting crime to the general public; however, the 
current research examines how surveillance images influence practices that are often 
hidden from public view, such as the practices of the police and businesses. 
 Video surveillance has been used in semi-private locations such as convenience 
stores, malls and banks since the early 1980s (Whitson, Doyle and Walby, 2009).  
Despite this, very little attention has been given to video surveillance of these spaces.  
Research on video surveillance in these locations has focused primarily on the day-to-day 
operations of security officers in video surveillance control rooms (see, Helten and 
Fischer, 2004; Lomell, 2004; Smith, 2004; Walby, 2005a; 2006).  Thus, video 
surveillance is monitored in control rooms where operators scan the images captured by 
the cameras for anything “out of the ordinary” (Lomell, 2004: 350).  From here persons 
are targeted and security officers may be deployed to deal with those who disrupt the 
normal scene.  The majority of exclusions are based on categorical suspicions and 
criminal behaviour (Lomell, 2004).  These findings appear to indicate that exclusionary 
practices are assisted by surveillance images. Video surveillance images are deployed as 
visual information that assists in carrying out institutional practices, such as preventing 
‘undesirables’ from tarnishing the reputation of a mall (Lomell, 2004: 354). In his 
institutional ethnography of a shopping mall video surveillance control room, Walby 
(2005a) examined how surveillance images construct reality.  The videos are viewed in 
real time and given meaning by the operators.  The information from the images is used 
to make citizen’s arrests and is distributed to other agencies such as the police, social 
services and the courts, including the Crown Counsel and defense attorney for use as 
! *!
evidence in court (Walby, 2005a).  Walby (2006) recognized the limits of his study of 
campus and apartment video surveillance security work and encouraged a further 
examination of how surveillance images constitute social and work relations.  This 
research responds to this call and other gaps in the literature by examining how the use of 
surveillance images influences institutional practices.  
 An examination of police use of images is vital as the police are in a unique 
position of authority to be able to “legitimately see, constitute, and articulate ... events”, 
such as the Rodney King assault (Goodwin, 1994: 626).  This position of authority also 
enables the police to constitute events captured in surveillance images.  Despite increased 
use of surveillance images by the police, how surveillance images influence police 
institutional practices has been overlooked in past research.  Previous research has not 
addressed how the police acquire and deploy surveillance images from businesses and 
how these images inform police practices.  Walby (2009) examined how images and 
video produced by police surveillance of male-with-male sex in public bathrooms were 
used to create perceptions of the truth about these events.  While this research examined 
the use of the surveillance images, it focused on police surveillance as opposed to private 
surveillance.  Other research on the police use of surveillance images has examined open-
street surveillance and its influence on policing (see Goold, 2003).  This research will 
address the gaps in the literature by examining how surveillance images obtained from 
private sources influence police institutional practices.  
 The final institution examined is the criminal courts.  The images that are 
produced by video surveillance are presented as evidence in the criminal courts.  Murphy 
(1999) argues that in the United Kingdom visual recordings have been accepted as 
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evidence by the courts.  The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled, in R. v. Nikolovski, that 
video produced by video surveillance is “admissible and relevant evidence” as long as it 
is demonstrated that the video has not been altered or changed and that judges can make a 
determination that it is the accused pictured in the surveillance image.  Images are now 
allowed to ‘speak for themselves’, having shifted from being illustrative to demonstrative 
evidence, in court and do not act solely as aids for human testimony (Valverde, 2006: 
157). The identification of suspects in surveillance images is highly prone to error (see 
Henderson, Bruce and Burton, 2001; Davis and Valentine, 2008) making it important to 
examine how the surveillance image as a type of visual information influence those 
involved in the judicial system. Despite the use of video surveillance evidence in courts 
no criminological research has examined how surveillance images influence court 
practices while engaging with contemporary surveillance theories.  This research will 
examine the use of surveillance images in court while engaging with the orienting 
concept of the surveillant assemblage. 
  Previous research has examined various components of the surveillant 
assemblage.  These works include the study of video surveillance signage (Lippert, 
2009), and public vigilance campaigns (Larsen and Piché, 2009).  Furthermore, Ericson 
(2007: 2-3) claims that to understand criminalization as a response to risk and uncertainty 
the uses of the surveillant assemblage by various institutions must be examined.  No 
previous research on the surveillant assemblage has focused on how surveillance images 
influence institutional practices.  
 The use of video surveillance and the images produced is a form of photography.  
Regarding still photography, Sontag (2001: 21-24) states that the photograph was 
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enrolled by the police, an institution of control, and used as a symbolic object and 
information.  Tagg (1988: 5) claims that the new techniques of representation and 
regulation, including photographs, were crucial to the restructuring of the state and the 
development of disciplinary networks, including the police. While the transformations 
enabled by the photograph in the 19th Century have previously been explored, this 
research seeks to explore how surveillance images have influenced various institutions in 
the late 20th Century and the 21st Century. 
 The research conducted on the uses of video surveillance has been wide-ranging, 
but has not addressed the influence of surveillance images on institutional practices. With 
the proliferation of video surveillance in Western societies, including Canada, it is 
important to engage in an examination of how surveillance images as visual information 
influence institutional practices at and beyond its place of creation.  The main research 
question that will be answered by this research is: How do surveillance images, as visual 
information, influence institutional practices?  Several additional research questions 
stemming from the main research question will be explored.  What influence do the 
surveillance image-informed practices of one of the institutions have on the others (e.g., 
how a businesses video surveillance system is set up; influence of police preparation of 
video on court presentation)?  How does the image transfer influence the relationships 
between institutions?  How does surveillance image-informed institutional practices 
influence those whose data are captured in surveillance images (e.g., implications at plea 
bargaining; clearance of suspects by police)?  Is the information from visual media (i.e., 
surveillance images) unique in its influences compared to information not gathered from 
visual media (e.g., oral statements given by eyewitnesses) used by the institutions for 
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similar purposes?  And lastly, how has the practice of using surveillance images in these 























4. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH PROCEDURES 
 Several research procedures were used in this research.  Interviews were 
conducted with subjects drawn from the three institutions of interest (i.e., business, police 
and the courts).  Interview subjects were selected using a combination of purposive and 
snowball sampling (Berg, 2007: 44).  Using contact information obtained from a search 
of relevant websites (e.g., police, legal offices, etc.) potential interview subjects were 
contacted and asked to participate in the research.  If those contacted were unwilling or 
unable to participate, snowball sampling was used and the subject was asked if they could 
provide a referral to another potential interview subject.  Snowball sampling was also 
used to recruit research subjects by asking interviewees to forward my contact 
information to other potential interviewees.  A total of fifteen (15) interviews were 
conducted between October 2009 and December 2009.  
Interview subjects were drawn from numerous Ontario communities ranging in 
size from approximately 25000 to 600000 citizens. Police interviews included one 
forensic identification officer (detective constable) (Police 1), an inspector (Police 2), 
four staff/detective sergeants (Police 3, 5-7), and a civilian forensic video analyst (Police 
4).  Each police employee (i.e., sworn officer or civilian member) was employed by a 
different police service.  The lawyer and business interviews overlapped with the policing 
communities.  Four defence lawyers, from the policing communities, were interviewed.   
An attempt was made to interview Ontario Crown Attorney’s offices, however, these 
requests were denied.  Business interviewees included a restaurant and bar owner in a 
Southwestern Ontario city (Business 1), a video surveillance salesperson who worked in 
various Ontario communities (Business 2), a loss prevention manager for a chain of retail 
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stores and gas-bars throughout Ontario (Business 3), and a loss prevention director for a 
national retailer (Business 4).  Lawyer 3 was also interviewed about his law office’s 
video surveillance4. 
 The interviews were conducted using multiple semi-structured (or semi-
standardized) interview schedules (Appendices A, B, C) due to the different institutions 
being examined in this research. These interviews allowed probing for answers beyond 
the prepared questions (Berg, 2007: 95) and assisted in yielding a more detailed 
understanding of the research topic.  The ability to probe and ask questions out of 
sequence also allowed for natural conversation to occur. 
 External documents were obtained including Toronto Police Service media 
releases, relevant case law, municipal budgets and video from the Toronto Crime 
Stoppers YouTube channel.  Toronto Police Service media releases were examined to 
further explore the claims made by various interview subjects as well as to explore 
aspects of surveillance images.  These documents supplemented the interview data. 
 The data, including transcribed interviews, were entered into qualitative analysis 
software for content analysis.  Content analysis assists in finding themes, patterns, biases 
and meanings through detailed, careful and systematic examination and interpretation of 
the material (Berg, 2007: 303-304).  Coding searched for themes related to the surveillant 
assemblage, institutional practices and other themes revealed in the data.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Additional business interviews were sought, however, several small businesses expressed they were either 
too busy or claimed inadequate knowledge to assist in my inquiry and some major retailers refused to 
participate in the research due to the sensitive nature of the information being sought. Unfortunately, due to 
this response from the business community, practices related to the use of surveillance images by business 
could only be glimpsed through this research. Future research using different methodologies should be 
initiated to better bring these practices into view. 
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5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 The research revealed that the surveillance images, as visual information, 
influence the practices of each institution studied.  The video surveillance practices of 
one influence the practices of others  (e.g., the quality of video surveillance deployed by 
businesses influences how police work with the image).  The use of surveillance images 
in the institutions examined revealed the expansion of video surveillance, including 
through function creep and the enrollment of new technologies into the surveillant 
assemblage.  The information from visual media (i.e., surveillance images) is unique in 
its influences on institutional practices compared to other kinds of information used by 
the institutions for similar purposes.  Lastly, the research contributes to the orienting 
concept surveillant assemblage by examining and refining key components of the 
surveillant assemblage including function creep, the data-double and the precautionary 
logic.   
Video Surveillance Expansion  
 Through the interviews it was discovered that, despite being less prevalent than 
business use of video surveillance, private citizens were increasingly using video 
surveillance to protect themselves and their property (Business 2; Lawyer 3; Police 2-6).  
The use of video surveillance by private citizens reveals the expansion of the surveillant 
assemblage into areas previously untouched by video surveillance. The use of video 
surveillance by private citizens is discussed in what follows; however, interviews were 
not conducted with private citizens due to methodological constraints (e.g., locating 
private citizens using video surveillance).   
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 Popular cultural representations of crime including television shows (e.g., CSI, 
Law & Order) are one reason for the increased production of surveillance images.  The 
CSI Effect refers to the rise in expectations, due to watching CSI: Crime Scene 
Investigation (CSI) and similar crime dramas, of crime victims and jurors with respect to 
forensic evidence, including surveillance images (see Dowler, Fleming and Muzzatti, 
2006; Schweitzer and Saks, 2007).  This effect places a greater burden on the prosecution 
to provide better forensic evidence as viewers of CSI and other crime dramas find their 
forensic evidence presented less convincing (Schweitzer and Saks, 2007).  Although the 
influences of popular cultural representations of video surveillance on the public were not 
directly explored, the interviews revealed the influence of these popular cultural 
representations on institutional practices and the expansion of surveillance. Those 
interviewed believed popular culture representations influenced other’s beliefs about the 
effectiveness of surveillance images.  Moreover, popular cultural representations of 
surveillance images create a disjunction between commonly held beliefs and what can be 
accomplished with surveillance images (e.g., image enhancement, time-frame of 
investigation) (Business 2; Police 1-7).  The CSI Effect does not only influence the beliefs 
of the general public.  Police officers and lawyers are also influenced by these 
representations (Business 2; Lawyer 2).  For example, a video of one lawyer’s client was 
disclosed to him that allegedly showed the client striking a pedestrian with his vehicle.  
However, the lawyer could not make out this event and remarked that the police possibly 
had a method of cleaning up the image (Lawyer 2), a belief possibly influenced by crime 
dramas. The CSI Effect creates an unrealistic expectation of what can be done with video 
surveillance and may contribute to the expansion of surveillance as the demand for 
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surveillance images increases the need to produce high quality images in greater numbers 
so that the images can effectively be used in police investigations.  
Video Surveillance Rationales: The Precautionary Logic 
 The precautionary logic fuels the use of video surveillance and surveillance 
images and is evinced in the myriad rationales for deploying video surveillance in 
businesses.  One of the main rationales of video surveillance systems was found to be 
crime prevention, primarily theft (including employee theft) or robbery prevention, or to 
capture images of crimes that can be used by police for investigative purposes (Business 
1-4). Related to crime prevention, video surveillance rationales included protecting 
employees from victimization (Business 4; Lawyer 3).  Other video surveillance 
rationales include the prevention and contention of liability claims (Business 1-4), 
monitoring of business operations, including restaurant management (Business 1) and 
accident prevention, such as monitoring for health and safety violations (Business 3; 
Police 4).  Images are transferred to the police for non-criminal investigations, for 
example in missing persons cases (Police 3).  Moreover, consistent with the 
precautionary logic businesses may deploy dummy cameras (i.e., a non-functioning 
camera box or dome) in an attempt to prevent future harms.  Although these dummy 
cameras are deployed with rationales consistent with the precautionary logic they rely on 
a false assumption about the deterrence value of cameras and are ineffective in providing 
evidence and therefore are ineffective in preventing all imaginable harms or recovering 
from a loss (Police 1).  The ability of the video surveillance system to create and store 
images is as important as the implementation of the system.  Without the ability to make 
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images the video surveillance system is unable to accomplish many of the stated purposes 
for implementing the system (e.g., contesting liability claims, investigating crime). 
 The end product of video surveillance, the image, is enrolled in a system that 
relies on the precautionary logic to fuel information transfer.  A business may distribute 
the surveillance image, or information gathered from a surveillance image, to mobilize 
employees to be vigilant against a possible criminal threat (Business 3).  Police release 
information to the media to locate a suspect that may be a danger to the public or to “help 
in finding a person that we feel is in jeopardy or danger” (Police 3).  These rationales 
appeal to the precautionary logic of preventing all imaginable harms. When the 
precautionary logic is used to justify video surveillance only those harms that support the 
video surveillance implementation are mentioned.  The harms appealed to include crime, 
harms related to insurance claims (Business 1-3), workplace injuries (Business 3) and the 
loss of business (Business 1, 3).  However, harms that may result from the use of video 
surveillance are often ignored in the stated rationales.  These harms include a loss of 
privacy as well as a potential loss of dignity for victims or wrongful accusations of guilt 
if the surveillance image is improperly distributed (see Lippert and Wilkinson, 2009).  
This reveals the irony of appealing to the precautionary logic, as a full accounting of 
possible future harms is impossible.  Therefore, in attempting to prevent a particular set 
of future harms (e.g., crime, insurance fraud) through the use of video surveillance, new 
harms are created or exacerbated (e.g., loss of privacy, wrongful accusations of guilt).  
Function Creep 
  Function creep is the use of surveillance technologies “for purposes that were not 
originally intended” (Monahan, 2007: 378).  It has arisen because the surveillance images 
! "*!
are readily available to be used to influence institutional practices beyond crime 
prevention and detection.  Function creep occurs with business video surveillance in 
multiple ways discussed below.  
 Function creep is evinced in an analysis of the privacy policy of Future Shop, a 
Canadian electronics chain store.  Future Shop’s privacy policy states that video 
surveillance is used for the purpose of “safety and loss prevention … [and] There may 
also be occasion where video footage is used for general demographic or traffic flow 
analysis” (Future Shop, 2009).  This is indicative of a system that was designed for loss 
prevention, which includes crime prevention, being used for a new purpose, that is, the 
gathering of demographic and traffic flow information. Function creep occurs with video 
surveillance initially implemented to monitor the gasoline pumps at gas stations.  The 
original rationale for video surveillance was to monitor gasoline spills and other safety 
violations, such as a customer using a pop can to hold the nozzle of the gasoline pump 
open (Police 4).  However, with rising gasoline prices gasoline and increased incidences 
of pump-and-go thefts, the surveillance images are now being used as evidence in 
criminal investigations (Business 3; Police 4).  Using surveillance images originally 
designed to monitor internal crime to investigate external crime (e.g., robbery) is another 
example.  This function creep may lead to a further expansion of surveillance if the 
business installs additional video surveillance to capture future external crime such as 
robberies.     
 The use of video surveillance to monitor a new range of activities as well as the 
addition of additional video surveillance cameras both contribute to function creep and 
the expansion of surveillance.  As new rationales for using video surveillance are 
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developed the amount of surveillance increases. Video surveillance starts with one 
rationale for monitoring a certain area or activity and snowballs to monitor a greater 
number of areas and activities.  This expansion of video surveillance is evinced in the 
following quotation: 
[Video surveillance] starts off with the entrances … for break and enter. 
Secondly, you put the second one on cash registers and bars, for theft. By 
employees and customers too … Thirdly you go on to all stairwells and 
that’s for slip and falls and insurance, preventative measures because that 
way you can see them. And then fourth would be the actual restaurant 
itself … So you are looking at the aspect of if there are mistakes in service 
or customer issues you can monitor those as well (Business 1).    
 
Video surveillance may begin as a response to one problem and, combined with an 
appeal to the precautionary logic, leads to a growth in video surveillance systems and the 
images they produce. The presence of function creep highlights Hier’s (2003: 405) claim 
that surveillance is both “a cause as well as an effect of intensified practices of social 
monitoring and information gathering”. 
 Other technologies are enrolled in the surveillant assemblage when they are used 
for video surveillance purposes or combined with the surveillance image. Cellular phones 
are used to access the surveillance images via the Internet (Business 1).  Cellular phone 
call records (Police 6) and point-of-sale/transaction records (Business 2, 3) are also 
enrolled in the surveillant assemblage contributing to one’s data-double.  The enrollment 
of new technologies, previously unrelated to video surveillance, demonstrates another 
way that function creep contributes the expansion of the surveillant assemblage.   
 Data-Doubles 
 When a person is caught on video surveillance that person’s information is 
abstracted into a data-double through a process that transfers the information for viewing 
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and/or storage.  The image and other information comprising the data-double may come 
to represent both the person and the event.  The camera indiscriminately collects 
information all those who enter its gaze.  Data-doubles are available for intervention 
immediately to those monitoring the system or to other parties (e.g., business owners, 
police, lawyers) or for later intervention (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 604).  If 
monitoring5 is occurring the intervention can be immediate (e.g., detaining the suspect) 
rather than reactive (e.g., transferring the information to the police to investigate the 
crime and arrest the subject) (Business 1, 3, 4; Lawyer 3).  Interventions are not limited 
to allegedly criminal matters.  Interventions on non-criminal matters include using the 
surveillance system to manage a restaurant (Business 1); transferring images to an 
insurance agency to settle liability claims (Business 1, 2); and preventing health and 
safety violations (Business 3).    
 Additional information is incorporated into the data-double along with the 
surveillance image.  This includes information gathered from eyewitnesses, such as how 
the suspect spoke (e.g., accent, specific phrases) (Police 1, 5), and information from 
technologies enrolled in the surveillant assemblage through function creep, such as point-
of-sale/transaction records (Business 2, 3) and cellular phone records (Police 6).  
Although this information is generally of no interest to the police, when a crime is 
reported, the data-doubles the police gather the information so that an intervention can be 
made. 
To reconstitute the abstracted data-double into a suspect, for intervention, 
investigators rely on the other evidence gathered during the investigation (e.g., clothes, 
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5 Monitoring practices varied across businesses (see below). 
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fingerprints).  This information can then be used to link a suspect with information from 
other crimes to charge the suspect with multiple offences.  For example, one interview 
subject referred to the outfits worn by robbery suspects as a “robbery costume” and 
described the multiple captures of one suspect’s data-double: 
So I had video of him arriving at the apartment building dressed one way, 
leaving ten minutes later in his robbery outfit. Then we have video of him 
committing the robbery and then we have video of him coming into the 
building in the same clothes and then leaving after having changed (Police 
4). 
 
The multiple captures of one’s data-double does not automatically reveal the identity of 
the suspect.  It is through additional work, including the gathering of physical evidence, 
that the data-double is linked to its real-world counterpart. 
 Information gathered in the course of an investigation may cause the police to 
seek out surveillance images from multiple locations.  When this information is compiled 
it is added to the data-double.  In one case a video of a suspect entering an apartment 
building after a sexual assault assisted police in locating the suspect (Police 4). When 
questioned the suspect claimed that at the supposed time of the assault he was on a train 
to visit his girlfriend.  He also denied having a goatee like the victim had reported.  The 
forensic video analyst retrieved video from the train station showing the suspect missing 
the train and leaving the station.  This video did not provide a clear image of the suspect’s 
face making it difficult to determine whether or not the suspect had a goatee.  Another 
surveillance image of the suspect walking into an apartment showed him carrying a case 
of beer.  Although this surveillance image also could not clearly show the suspect’s facial 
hair (or lack thereof) it led the analyst to retrieve video from a Beer Store.  The Beer 
Store surveillance image showed the suspect with a goatee on the day of the attack.  The 
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video evidence was enough to contradict the suspect’s alibi and he was charged by the 
police and eventually convicted (Police 4)6.  This demonstrates the number of times in a 
day that a person’s image is abstracted into flows of information that are collected and 
assembled into a data-double and demonstrates that while video surveillance may 
automatically abstract information, however, the assembly of images into a complete 
data-double is not an automatic process.  Abstracting various pieces of information into 
data-doubles requires additional work on the part of the investigator(s).  As this case 
demonstrates, a person may change their appearance in an attempt to avoid capture by the 
police.  The longer the period between commission of the act and the apprehension of the 
suspect the more time the suspect has to change his or her appearance.  This may increase 
the amount of work required by police to re-assemble the data-double to match a suspect.  
Contrary to its depiction in previous research, the surveillant assemblage is not a well-
oiled machine that operates effortlessly; rather it is like a rusty wheel that requires a great 
deal of effort to make it turn to accomplish the desired result.   
 The data-double may also be deconstructed to prevent potential legal problems, 
such as privacy violations.  When the retail/gas-bar chain studied wishes to put their staff 
on alert due to a string of robberies or other crimes, a bulletin describing the physical 
attributes and modus operandi of the suspect will be distributed.  The bulletin does not 
contain the image of the suspect (Business 4).  Therefore, some information from the 
data-double is removed to protect the presumed innocence of the suspect as well as the 
company from any privacy complaints or lawsuits.  However, the bulletin becomes part 
of the target’s data-double, as this information can still be used for intervention (e.g., a 
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6 It is unknown what other evidence, if any, was available to assist in securing the conviction. 
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call to police, sounding a silent alarm, etc.) against the subject.  This technique of 
removing valuable personal information from one’s data-double is done so that the 
information can be distributed to assist businesses with their crime prevention goals while 
protecting the privacy rights of an individual captured on video surveillance consistent 
with the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).   
 The life span of one’s data-double is dependent on the retention schedule of those 
collecting the data.  Police retention schedules are dependent on the type of crime and 
whether or not the crime has been solved7 (see Police 1-5, 7).  Although original copies 
are kept on file, with respect to the retention schedule, working copies may be removed 
from separate systems when no longer required (Police 4).  Retention of surveillance 
images from businesses is dependent on the storage capacity of their video surveillance 
systems (Business 1-3).  The businesses may also retain an original copy if the video is 
used for investigative purposes (Business 1, 3; Lawyer 3).  With the current data-storage 
capabilities “if there is no reason to get rid of them [the images] we [the police] don't get 
rid of them.  Simple as that because it’s CD's now it is so easy just to keep it in the case 
file” (Police 5).  The ability to store vast amounts of information allows businesses such 
as the retail/gas-bar chain store examined to create and store data-doubles for each 
incident that include surveillance images and other information so that they may be 
accessed, for intervention, at a later time (Business 3).  Although thousands of CDs or 
DVDs may cause physical storage issues in the future the ever-decreasing physical size 
of digital storage devices may negate storage concerns.  For example the next generation 
SDXC card will hold up to 2 terabytes of data which equals twenty days of high 
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definition video (SD Card Association, n.d.).   The ability to store vast amounts of data 
could lead to increased workload due to the amount of information that may have to be 
searched through for each case.  Through the availability of technologies with the 
capacity to store a great amount of data the surveillant assemblage will expand while 
requiring less physical space but ironically potentially more human intervention.  
BUSINESSES 
 Business interviews revealed the use of video surveillance by businesses has 
influenced businesses practices.  Business video surveillance arrangements differed 
among the five businesses examined.  For several reasons, including camera-types (e.g., 
point-tilt-zoom, infra-red, wide-angle, fixed lens, etc.), the number of cameras, 
monitoring arrangements (e.g., 24/7, infrequent, review only), staffing and storage device 
type (e.g., VHS, hard-drive) it can be claimed that there is no such thing as a normal 
video surveillance system. 
Cost, Quality and Vantage Point 
 The cost of the video surveillance system influences both the quality and vantage 
point of the images (Business 2). The system cost affects both small family-run and 
larger businesses.  Whereas the difference between a lower end model and the top end 
model for a small business may be a few hundred dollars the cost for a larger business to 
make a jump in quality and number of cameras can be in excess of ten thousand dollars 
(Business 2).  If the business chooses to purchase the lower cost and inferior equipment 
they sacrifice both quality and vantage point that can have an impact on the capacity of 
the surveillance image to be used as evidence for police investigations and court 
presentation (see below).  Police may make recommendations on video surveillance 
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placement and number of cameras but they cannot recommend specific software or 
hardware to use (Police 3-6).  Thus, businesses may not realize they are sacrificing image 
quality for cost savings.  The police’s inability to effectively influence business video 
surveillance creates a point of resistance that reduces the ability of the surveillant 
assemblage to produce the desired effects (i.e., locating suspects, securing criminal 
convictions).      
Privacy 
 Interview subjects often appealed to the public nature of the video surveillance 
when discussing the possibility of privacy issues arising from image use (Business 2; 
Lawyer 3; Police 1-3).  Since video surveillance exists in areas considered open to public 
scrutiny the expectation of privacy is diminished.  Unless video surveillance is 
undertaken in an area where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy such as a private 
residence (Police 3) or changing room (Lawyer 3) business video surveillance was not 
considered to be violating one’s privacy.  With respect to businesses if you decide to 
enter the premises then the rights of the business owner “supersede yours.  He [the 
business owner] can put whatever he wants in there to record. You don't want to be on 
camera, don't go in there” (Business 2).  However, one interviewee stated that for his 
business some areas, such as bathrooms and employee break rooms, were off limits to 
camera surveillance (Business 4).  Consumers also retain the right to be notified of the 
collection of their personal information and to not have that information disclosed for 
purposes other than those that it was collected for (PIPEDA 2000).  The research 
revealed that care is typically taken in the transfer of the images to protect personal 
information. Thus, the transfers are compliant with PIPEDA.  Precautions taken include 
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not allowing public access to the images (Business 1, 3), limited staff access to 
surveillance images (Business 3) and obtaining assurances from the police that third 
parties will not be identified in subsequent data transfers (Police 6).  
 Legislation governing the collection of data by video surveillance and the Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) are enrolled in the surveillant assemblage 
through business use of video surveillance.  However, the influence of these two shoots 
of the surveillant assemblage on businesses may be much less powerful than the 
surveillance technology.  Businesses may either be unaware of the legislation governing 
the protection of personal information (Business 1) or be dismissive of the OPC’s legal 
power (Business 2).  Even in cases where the recommendations of the OPC are followed 
this may be more of a case of the technology influencing the business practices than the 
OPC influencing the practices.  For example, the OPC guidelines for the use of video 
surveillance by businesses states: “Recordings should only be kept as long as necessary 
to fulfill the purpose of the video surveillance. Recordings no longer required should be 
destroyed” (OPC 2008).  If no crime is reported, or the image is not needed for some 
other purpose, the recording is deleted consistent with the guidelines (Business 1-4).  
However, the deletion of the images is dictated by the video surveillance system since 
some automatically overwrite the information once storage capacity is reached.  It is quite 
possible that once more storage space is available businesses will cease to be in 
compliance with the OPC recommendations, demonstrating the power of the technology 





 Business video surveillance monitoring arrangements varied demonstrating that 
even in similar institutions, the various shoots of the surveillant assemblage operate in 
vastly different ways.  Business practices are informed in different ways by the varied 
monitoring arrangements. No monitoring was undertaken at the offices of the video 
surveillance salesman who was interviewed (Business 2).  Active monitoring was 
generally not undertaken at the restaurant or law office examined (Business 1; Lawyer 3).  
However, the owner of the restaurant could monitor the video surveillance via his iPhone 
(Business 1) and the law offices had viewing screens set up so the staff could monitor the 
parking lot for any suspicious or potentially dangerous activity prior to exiting the 
building (Lawyer 3).  For the restaurant owner the monitoring arrangement allowed him 
to manage his restaurant from home.  It also enabled him to assist police in searching the 
building and ensuring everything was in order after an alarm was sounded and he could 
not attend the restaurant due to being unable to drive at the time (Business 1).  The 
retail/gas-bar chain actively monitored the stores through a central location and loss 
prevention management could also monitor the video surveillance images from their 
laptop computers (Business 3).  This system allowed the business to monitor both 
criminal activity and unsafe employee activity (e.g., standing on a milk crate) or other 
undesirable employee actions (e.g., wearing improper uniform attire).  Loss prevention 
could respond to any employee alarms and notify the proper police service (Business 3).  
The other retail chain examined contracted third party security officers to monitor video 
surveillance in high-risk stores (Business 4).  This allowed for monitoring of stores that 
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are high-risk while avoiding the need to employ unneeded staff when stores did not 
require the extra security.   
 That the shoots of the surveillant assemblage can operate in various ways allows 
businesses to minimize labour costs by tailoring the operation of the system to their 
specific needs, such as only using additional security and video surveillance monitoring 
at high-risk stores or by centralizing the video control room for all the stores across a 
chain.  A lack of monitoring requires no additional staff. This maintains low labour costs 
while attempting to prevent crime.  Businesses have the primary role of preventing 
crimes in their stores (see Ericson, 2007: 4), however, this leads to an increased workload 
for police when the surveillant assemblage fails to prevent crime and instead the police 
services who must absorb the cases and the surveillance images produced as evidence 
(see below).  
Business Surveillance Image Representation  
 The surveillance images represent, or stand for, both activities and the persons 
engaged in these activities.  What the surveillance image comes to represent is dependent 
on information not available in the image.  What may be seemingly obvious to someone 
in the business conducting the video surveillance may not be obvious to someone outside 
of the institution.  A business owner may believe that an image shows a theft has 
occurred, however if the images are shown to an objective third party, the third party may 
not be able to draw the same conclusions as the business owner (Business 2).  In this case 
the surveillance image may not be capable of representing the criminal event unless other 
information is available to the third party.  This demonstrates that the surveillance image 
does not work in isolation.  Instead other evidence, gathered through the various 
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mechanisms of the surveillant assemblage, is required so that the image may be capable 
of relaying all of the necessary information to the viewer.  
POLICE 
 The smallest police service (approx. population served 25000) did not have 
dedicated staff to work with the surveillance images (Police 1).  The other services, 
ranging in size of population served from approximately 49000 to 600000, had some 
level of staff dedicated to this purpose in either stand-alone video services units or 
another unit (e.g., IT Services).  One service had implemented non-networked computers 
in their various policing units to increase their ability to process surveillance images 
(Police 5).  
Workload 
 Despite its status as “sophisticated information technology”, using surveillance 
images can require a significant amount of human labour (see Lippert, 2009; 513).  A 
forensic video analyst for a policing community of approximately 600000 citizens works 
with thousands of images and about four hundred cases a year8  (Police 4).  Increased 
workload is related to the staffing of the video services unit (Police 3-5) which leads to 
the need to prioritize investigations, to the detriment of the investigation of less serious 
crimes, or other institutional changes, such as the downloading of surveillance image-
related work to other staff, who may be less qualified in surveillance image processing, 
within the police service (Police 5).  The less serious cases downgraded onto individual 
officers, as opposed to a forensic video analyst, results in images being handled by 
officers who may be under-qualified to analyze or enhance the image.  Downgrading may 
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also shift the priorities of those officers whose efforts may be better used elsewhere (e.g., 
interviewing witnesses, conducting field investigations).  The amount of time an officer 
who is not familiar with image analysis software, due to a lack of training or on the job 
experience, will likely be greater than the time required for a forensic video analyst to do 
the same work.  Therefore, the police may well not be working as efficiently as they may 
be if these images were not flooding the services and increasing workloads.  As more 
surveillance images are made available to the police for investigative purposes the 
police’s ability to process these images is lessened and the surveillant assemblage does 
not operate efficiently.  Despite the growth of the surveillant assemblage and the 
proliferation of video surveillance, the ability to act on the information from the 
surveillant assemblage has not increased at the same rate.   
Prior to the proliferation of business video surveillance police officers would 
canvas the scene for eyewitnesses to get an account of the events that occurred.  Now, in 
addition to canvassing the scene this way, the police must also assess whether the crime 
was captured on video surveillance (Police 4).  This includes canvassing other businesses 
in the area for additional surveillance images that may show the suspect (Police 3, 4, 6, 
7).  After talking to the eyewitness, and taking a statement, it is now a ‘best practice’ for 
the police officer and witness to watch the video together during which the police officer 
takes notes and compares the eyewitness’ claims with what is shown in the surveillance 
images (Police 1).  This also ensures that the date and time on the system corresponded 
with the timeframe of the alleged occurrence and any discrepancies are accounted for 
(Police 4).  If appropriate the video is then taken as evidence for use in the subsequent 
investigation (see below).   
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 The business video surveillance system set-up also influences police workload.  
Police collection of the surveillance images for evidence can be as simple as the removal 
of a VHS tape or making a copy of the digital files.  However, the process often can be 
more complicated and require the video surveillance system installer to attend the scene 
to copy the images (Business 2; Police 3).  The technical knowledge or ability of a 
business owner or employee operating the system determines whether or not the system 
installer or a more qualified employee needs called (Business 2, 3).  A video surveillance 
installer estimated he was needed in sixty to seventy percent of the cases where image 
retrieval was necessary from his systems (Business 2).  Moreover, some ‘big box’ 
retailers transfer their images to a central repository that may increase the time before 
police access the images (Police 2).  To obtain the best quality evidence it may be 
necessary for the police to duplicate the hard-drive of the video surveillance system.  This 
requires the system to be off-line for a period of time (Police 7).  This has an impact on 
both police, as they must take the time necessary to copy the hard drive, and the business 
whose system is out of order for up to several hours9.  This is ironic as the ability for the 
police to obtain the greatest surveillance image, for evidence, creates a situation where 
the system must be shut down, thereby eliminating the system’s ability to create video 
surveillance evidence if a crime were to occur.  As one shoot of the surveillant 
assemblage is extended, another is temporarily hacked off.  The time required for 
retrieving surveillance images may delay an investigation, or response times to other low 
priority crimes. 
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9 This practice may change as a Quebec Superior Court judgment held that the hard-drive need not be 
directly copied, and that a loss of information (i.e., date, time, camera-number, other watermarks) did not 
constitute “an altered or changed video recording” (R. c. MacNeil, 2008).  However, police may still choose 
to copy the hard drive to maintain the best video footage for investigative purposes. 
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 Workload increases due to the growth of the surveillant assemblage are best 
exemplified by the comparison of two hypothetical cases brought up by a police 
interviewee (Police 3).  The hypothetical has been expanded to include information 
obtained in the other interviews.  In the first case no surveillance images were available 
as evidence, whereas in the second the suspect was captured in a surveillance image10.  
The case described involves a convenience store theft and the only thing the clerk, the 
sole eyewitness, saw was the perpetrator leaving the store after stealing an item.  The 
eyewitness did not witness any useful identifiers of the suspect.  After the police officer 
responds to the incident and takes eyewitness statements, an incident report is completed 
and passed to a police investigator responsible for the case.  Without the surveillance 
image the case would be filed until more information, such as a link to another crime, is 
obtained.  In this scenario, with no investigative leads, the case “would be quickly filed 
within a matter of seconds of the first investigator reading that report” (Police 3).   
Figure 1: Theft Not Captured in Surveillance Image
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10 Both hypothetical situations assume that no other evidence (e.g., fingerprints), beyond the eyewitness 
account, was available.  This situation is plausible due to the care that is often taken by a robbery suspect to 














 In the second scenario the suspect is captured on video surveillance and more 
work is required.  As in the first scenario the officer attends the scene and interviews the 
eyewitness.  The officer must then seize the surveillance images for evidence.  The time 
required to obtain the surveillance images may be exacerbated by several factors (see 
above).  An incident report is created the case is assigned to an investigator, who realizes 
that the surveillance images are in a multiplexed format11.  The surveillance images are 
transferred to a forensic video analyst who converts the images so they can be reviewed.  
If no forensic video unit is in place the images may be transferred to another service to 
get the images out of the multiplexed format (Police 1).  In this scenario the theft is 
shown in the image, however, the angle and quality of the surveillance image make it 
difficult to identify the suspect.  At this point the forensic video analyst or other 
investigators may do additional work such as returning to the scene to take measurements 
to assist in obtaining the height of the suspect (Police 4).  Using the data-double that has 
been created, a bulletin is made and distributed within the police service in an attempt to 
get another police officer to make an identification based on information they may 
possess.  A media release is also created to get tips from the public.  The release of the 
surveillance image and other case information to the news media and Crime Stoppers 
leads to the police receiving a few tips and these are investigated.  The investigation into 
the tips received may lead to additional work such as covert surveillance by the police 
(Police 6).  If no suspect is located after investigating the tips the police may send a 
bulletin to other police services (Police 6).  These police services are then able to cross-
reference the case data-doubles located in the other service’s files.  After all of the extra 
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11 A multiplexed system captures various camera feeds onto a single storage device, alternating the feed 
that is being stored. 
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work associated with the image, if no suspect is located, the case ends up being filed 
pending further information (Police 3).  If there is no suspect to charge the resolution (or 
lack thereof) of both hypothetical situations is the same, with both cases being filed 
pending further information.  However, the amount of work put into the investigation has 
increased by forty to sixty-hours (Police 3)12.   
Figure 2: Theft Captured in Surveillance Image(s) 
 
  
The officer noted that despite the availability of surveillance images there is only 
a minor improvement over those cases not involving surveillance images.  The lack of a 
resolution to cases involving surveillance images demonstrates a disconnection between 
what is believed can be accomplished, through the surveillant assemblage, with the 
images and reality.  For example, one businessman espoused a belief that “the conviction 
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The additional steps mentioned in other interviews could drastically affect the number of additional hours 

























rate in a camera covered area is 100 percent” (Business 1).  With the police claiming that 
there is only a slight improvement in the resolution of cases with surveillance images this 
belief is shown to be false.  While there may well be a slight improvement in the 
clearance rate of thefts it comes “at a huge cost. That now we [the police] have had to add 
more investigators to handle the same amount of crime that we had in the past because 
there is more evidence [and] there is more data” (Police 3).  The increased workload 
highlights that the video surveillance provides an image that is “a mile wide but only an 
inch deep because it does not in itself provide detailed knowledge about the person whose 
behavior is being momentarily captured and made visible” (Ericson, 2007: 52).  Ericson 
(2007: 52) claims that it is through the combination of the video surveillance system with 
other technologies that the “depth and intensity of surveillance are achieved.”  However, 
as the preceding has demonstrated, a depth of surveillance, accomplished through a 
drastic increase both in the amount of data collected and in the workload of the police, 
does not guarantee the resolution of a case.   
 Despite the workload increases associated with the expansion of the surveillant 
assemblage mention above, the presence of the photographic evidence may, in some 
instances, decrease the workload of police in other instances where it is used to show that 
a false crime report was given.  The surveillance image may show that the person whom 
reported the crime was attempting to cover-up an offence by making the false report. 
I mean if you have a victim saying that, you know, ‘he came in he pointed 
a gun to my head and I gave him all the money’ … Then all of a sudden 
you see the video, the person comes in, buys a pack of cigarettes and 
leaves. You know what I mean, and the next thing you know they [the 
employee] are just ripping the money (Police 5). 
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Another interviewee reported a case where a woman reported being robbed as she was 
leaving a casino, however, the video evidence proved there was no crime committed and 
she was later charged with Public Mischief, for causing the police to commence an 
unnecessary investigation (Police 3).  In both instances the police were saved the work 
associated with entering into investigative work that would have been unnecessary given 
that the reported crime had not committed.  Moreover, the images would have provided 
evidence to allow the police to charge the original complainant in each case.  
News Media and Crime Stoppers Transfer  
 During the course of an investigation the ‘data-double’ including surveillance 
images may be released to third parties such as the news media and Crime Stoppers.  
Police make several considerations when releasing this information to the public.  The 
quality of the image is important because the police are interested in obtaining a positive 
identification of the suspect and do not want to receive tips that may lead to an innocent 
person being questioned (Police 3).  The types of crimes depicted in images that are given 
to the newspapers and Crime Stoppers are also considered as the police do not want the 
public to become desensitized to the images due to overexposure of certain types of 
minor offences and therefore less likely to pay attention to the content and submit tips 
(Police 3).  This may not always be the case as some police services distribute a narrow 
range of crimes depicted in surveillance images to Crime Stoppers (see Lippert and 
Wilkinson, 2009). 
 Some consideration is also given to victims of crime with respect to the release of 
surveillance images.  The police will attempt to get the consent of the victim to release 
the photographs, but may do so without consent if the crime is of great public interest 
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(Police 2).  In those instances that the images are released to the media it was stated that 
care is taken to remove the victim from the image by cropping the photograph or digitally 
distorting the victims face (Police 1, 3-7).  However, despite best efforts to distort the 
victim or other third parties, errors or omissions occur.  Care was taken to remove third 
parties from the Toronto Police media releases.  However, in one instance two employees 
were shown in a video (Toronto Police Service 2009f).  This video demonstrates an 
inconsistent removal of third parties, as one customer was obscured but the employees 
were not.  
Quality, Vantage Point and Content 
 The ability of police to successfully use surveillance images to identify a suspect 
depends on both the image quality and vantage point of the video surveillance.  The 
placement of cameras, camera quality, and recording device quality are the responsibility 
of the business that implements the system.  Together the vantage point and quality of the 
systems contributes to the content of the images.  The content includes not only what is 
shown (e.g., the crime in progress) but also what may not be shown (e.g., the suspect’s 
face).  Without clear images of the suspect and the crime the police face a greater 
challenge to locate and charge a suspect.  For example, if the video surveillance is 
deployed to deter or catch employee’s stealing from the cash register than the camera 
may be set up with a vantage point that will not capture other crimes that occur.  The 
cameras “will look at the cash register but won't show the door. So they [the business] 
will be the victim of a robbery and all we see is hands going into a till and leaving and 
again it captures no evidence that we [the police], or the courts can use” (Police 3).  Due 
to the vantage point of the cameras the only information available in the images is that a 
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third party (i.e., not the cashier) was stealing the money.  Although this may prevent false 
accusations being leveled against the employee it will not assist in locating a suspect or 
securing a conviction.  
 When low quality systems are used the police have a greater difficulty identifying 
the suspect.  Additional work is often required to make up for the lack of image quality.  
For example, an investigator may return to the scene of the crime and re-photograph 
clothing seized from a suspect under the same lighting conditions and using the same 
video surveillance cameras that initially caught the suspect’s image or use a “height stick 
which is just a board marked in feet and inches” to determine if any distortion of the 
suspect occurred in the photograph (Police 4).  This additional work is a result of the poor 
image quality and the decisions made by businesses with respect to the video surveillance 
set-up.  The low quality systems deployed by some businesses, due to cost or ignorance, 
may create an inequality between businesses.  Those businesses that do not have the 
resources (e.g., money, knowledge of what systems work best) may find that the police 
are unable to adequately solve crimes committed against them.  
 Compounding the difficulties associated with poor image quality is public belief, 
possibly due to the CSI Effect (see above), that a poor image can be digitally manipulated 
or enhanced.  The police must contend with the “unreasonable expectation that we have 
this massive computer that we can take this CCTV image, put it in and then it does some 
holographic view of the facial features and determines that it is [name retracted] who 
lives down the street” (Police 2). Due to popular culture representations the public have a 
belief that since someone has “captured it [the crime] on videotape, that now it is going to 
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solve everything" (Police 3). However, the following analogy demonstrates the reality of 
working with video surveillance images: 
Take a look at a cartoon in a newspaper. You look at it and it looks great. 
Now take a magnifying glass and zoom in on that comic strip. It doesn't 
make it clear, it makes it more blurry.  You realize it is just a bunch of 
dots and the more you zoom in the less of an idea you have of what the 
image is. And that is what the video is (Police 3).   
 
These misconceptions affect more than just the general public.  In one instance a police 
officer had asked one interview subject to; “Do me a favour. See that guy in the 
background, bring him up full screen and clean him up” (Business 2). If the image is of 
poor quality or the vantage point does not accurately capture the suspect there is little the 
police can improve it (see above).  The police attempt to counteract these misconceptions 
through public education (Police 5).  However, due to the popularity of these television 
programs it is possible these attempts at education will have little influence in altering 
current perceptions.  As workloads increase and the police are unable to address minor 
crimes despite the public believing the surveillance images will make a case the fact that 
the police are ill equipped to solve minor crimes is highlighted. 
Budget Constraints 
 The influence that surveillance images being gathered by police has on police 
workload may be further exacerbated by budgetary limitations. Thus, another institution, 
municipal government, is enrolled in the surveillant assemblage and influences how the 
police work with the images.  Budget constraints may exacerbate the problems arising 
from increased workloads.  As one interviewee relayed;   
But because of the fiscal constraints that are there now, we can't just keep 
putting more people at the problem. The public is going to have to live 
with the new reality and the fact that even though a minor crime was 
captured on video, we might get to a point where it was a minor theft, less 
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than 50 or 100 dollars that we can't put those kind of resources into it, that 
we can't even look at it. Even though we have collected the data it might 
just be filed or stored where we don't do anything with it, because we don't 
have the manpower to do anything with it (Police 3). 
 
As the preceding quotation suggests those crimes deemed to be minor might not be 
investigated due to a lack of personnel available to handle the images.  This is currently a 
concern for the police, as backlogs already exist in the processing of surveillance images 
(Police 3-5).  An attempt was made to determine the actual dollar-value associated with 
the influence of surveillance images on police budgets by reviewing the various budgets 
of Ontario municipalities.  However, this information could not be located due to how the 
budgets were itemized (i.e., budgets did not list video services units)13.  As demonstrated 
by the influence of municipal budgets on policing, and the ability to process surveillance 
images, the surveillant assemblage depends not only on the technology and people to 
process the information gleaned from the technology, but other institutions also influence 
the operation of the surveillant assemblage in ways that may not be immediately 
apparent. 
Institutional Restructuring 
 The institutional restructuring influenced by surveillance images varies across 
police services.  New units have been created to deal with forensic image processing 
which results in the reorganization of police service’s organizational structure (Police 3).  
This also leads to personnel additions, including forensic video analysts (Police 3, 4, 7). 
The increasing number of images in concert with other internal and external pressures, 
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13 The budget of one police service was more detailed prior to the implementation of the video services 
unit.  This made it even more difficult to assess a possible dollar-value associated with the influences of 
surveillance images on police budgets. 
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such as budget constraints (Police 3), has caused stresses on the ability of the video 
analysts to process the images.  One police service is facing a situation where: 
Our [the police] capacity to handle the amount of data and images that is 
coming in is greater than our ability to handle them at this point. Because 
the time lag is growing. When we first created the unit we were able to 
keep up with the amount of images that were coming in but now there is 
so much coming in, the length of time between seizure and analysis has 
grown from weeks to months to now I think we are in the non-emergency 
type case almost three to six months behind because of the amount of data 
the population is collecting  (Police 3).   
 
Moreover, charges for summary offences can only be laid for six months after the crime 
at which time the offence can no longer be acted upon.  Since summary offence cases are 
only open for six months these crimes may not have the images processed, due to the 
backlog, prior to the case being closed.  This demonstrates another instance where the 
ability of the surveillant assemblage to resolve a case comes to a grinding halt due in part 
to external factors.  Stresses associated with increased workloads have caused other 
police services to implement policy changes.  One police service recently implemented a 
policy that dictates that only images from the most serious crimes (e.g., homicide, sexual 
assault, armed robbery) will be transferred to the lone video analyst, who works on 400 
cases a year, for analysis (Police 4).  The policy makes it the responsibility of the 
investigating officer to do additional analysis of the images, however the officer may go 
to the analyst for assistance (Police 4).  These issues also affect the victims of minor 
crimes who might have fewer resources given to their case.  Responding to the increased 
workload on their video technician, another police service completed a pilot program in 
which a non-networked computer was placed in the break-and-enter unit so that the unit 
could conduct their own video analysis.  Due to its success this program has since 
expanded to the other units within the department (Police 5).  When questioned as to how 
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the availability of these images would continue to influence the police service one 
interviewee stated:  
Stresses in any environment force adaptation, force evolution. We are 
going to have to evolve, we are going to have to adapt to accommodate the 
preponderance of this type of data that video surveillance imagery, the 
amount that is coming in, we have to evolve and change to adapt (Police 
3).   
 
The institutional changes brought on by surveillance images are significant and 
demonstrate how new technologies within the surveillant assemblage have drastic 
implications for the institutions enlisted in the assemblage. 
Victims of Police Misconduct 
 The leveling of surveillance hierarchies was evinced in two of the interviews.  
Two lawyers discussed cases in which their clients had been charged with offences but 
later due to the availability of pertinent surveillance images their clients were shown to be 
the victims of police misconduct14.  One case involved the assault of a former 
professional athlete who was assaulted by police at his private residence15.  On the advice 
of his lawyer, he had installed a video surveillance system that was activated by motion 
sensors.  The surveillance images showed several police officers taking the client down 
and placing him in handcuffs.  However, in the police reports it was alleged that the 
suspect took a fighting stance and moved towards the officers.  After reviewing the 
videotape of the incident the prosecution dropped all charges against the client (Lawyer 
3).  Without the video evidence this man may have been convicted of the charges laid 
against him and sentenced despite being the victim of police misconduct.  In another 
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14 The charges against the client of Lawyer 2 were still pending at the time of the interview and the case 
was also being investigated by the Ontario Special Investigations Unit (SIU).  The charges against Lawyer 
3’s client were dropped and no SIU investigation or civil lawsuits were instigated. 
15 Although this case does not involve surveillance images from business cameras it demonstrates how 
private surveillance images influence police practices. 
! %%!
instance a man was taking food to his brother, a drug addict, in a motel at the same time 
the police were conducting a drug bust.  The police proceeded to use force against the 
brother of the client, who was left with possible brain damage.  The police located trace 
amounts of crack cocaine and charged both the client and his brother with possession.  
The charges are still pending at this time, however the video surveillance taken by the 
motel allowed the suspect to pursue the case with the Ontario Special Investigations Unit 
(Lawyer 2).   
 These two examples demonstrate another way that police practices are influenced 
by surveillance images and how this information can be used to prove allegations against 
the police and simultaneously disprove false criminal allegations against a suspect.  The 
cases also demonstrate how video surveillance in certain locations may be used to help 
level social hierarchies.  The locations of these incidents, a private residence (Lawyer 3) 
and a “seedy motel” (Lawyer 2) may have caused the police to act in a manner they 
would not have if they suspected video surveillance would capture their actions and they 
would be open to public scrutiny.  In the age of professional policing, police officers “are 
told and should remember; ‘conduct yourself as if you are always on video’… You are 
professional you want people to perceive you as professional and you should be …” 
(Police 1).  Despite this mantra, it is evident that the threat of capture alone is often not 
enough and that the presence of the image has greater influences on the police than the 
threat of being captured on video.  
Representing Criminal Images 
 As noted above, digital information that contributes to the data-double includes 
point-of-sale (POS) information (Business 2, 3), and cellular phone records (Police 6).  
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After seeking assistance from other police services, police in one community were able to 
combine surveillance images of bank robbery suspects; the information received from 
another police service and the cellular phone records of the suspects to lay charges.  The 
data-double of the suspect that allowed intervention, included information obtained from 
a cellular phone company, showing that the suspect’s cellular phone was using cell 
towers in the community at the time the robberies were committed (Police 6). Combining 
this information with the surveillance images created a data-double that was useful for 
laying the charges.  The use of cellular phone records also demonstrates how 
technologies enrolled in the surveillant assemblage through function creep contribute to 
the data-double.  The need for additional sources of information demonstrates that the 
images sometimes are incapable of relaying enough information to make an accurate 
representation of the events or the suspect.  The amount of information needed to 
constitute the surveillant assemblage is greater than what is provided by just one 
technology.  The surveillant assemblage relies on its various parts to create data-doubles 
that can be successfully acted upon.   
 Within the news releases that were examined the images come to represent the 
criminal actor, although they may not come to represent the criminal event itself.  Only 
one of the press releases was accompanied by video that showed a representation of the 
criminal event (Toronto Police Service 2009f). The remaining releases only represented 
the suspects.  The press releases represent the persons pictured as suspects that are 
alleged (Toronto Police Service 2009a) or reported (Toronto Police Service 2009b; 
2009c; 2009d; 2009e; 2009f) to have committed certain criminal acts.  These 
representations are used in an attempt to gather information from the public, via the 
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representations being distributed by the media, to assist with locating a suspect.  
Similarly, surveillance images have been used to represent cases of child abduction such 
as that of James Bulger in Britain (see Hay 1995).  The case of Tori Stafford an eight-
year old from Woodstock, Ontario, whose ‘abduction’ was captured on video 
surveillance, demonstrates how the meanings of surveillance images can be represented.  
Originally, the video was represented as Tori walking away willingly with a woman, 
however, later the police would classify the case as an abduction (YouTube 2009)16, and 
the representations of the video transformed along with the change in classification.  Due 
to new information (e.g., tips, other evidence) being applied to the images, no longer 
were the images representing Tori walking away willingly but rather her being abducted.  
COURT 
 As previously noted, Crown attorneys would not participate in this research so the 
following analysis relies on defence lawyer, business and police interview data.  From the 
data it was evident that surveillance images influence lawyers and the criminal court 
process in ways that other evidence may not.  The surveillance images influence plea-
bargaining, jury trials and non-jury trial processes.  The surveillance image is a new tool 
that lawyers use when arguing their case.  
 The surveillance image may be able to captivate the attention of a judge or jury 
more easily than other forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprint analysis).  This is especially 
true for evidence that allegedly portrays a violent offence:  
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16 Global News originally broadcasted this information on its nightly newscast, however the video was 
accessed through Toronto Police’s YouTube channel.  The appropriation of the video demonstrates how 
surveillance images, once in the public domain, can be accessed, stored and rebroadcast by those who were 
not the original recipient. 
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The evidence of that vicious attack will speak to a jury more because they 
will actually be able to see what has happened… [The offence] can be 
very hard to visualize. People can explain it they can show the after 
photos. They can show the fingerprint on the weapon. But when it comes 
down to it they are just words and lots of jurors tend to zone out. But if 
you have that visual punch from some type of closed-circuit television 
image their attention is caught (Police 1). 
 
This was reiterated by a lawyer who stated “if it [the video] has such a significant visceral 
effect that would be against me, I have probably made a deal and am not in front of that 
judge”  (Lawyer 3).  The visceral effect of the images combined with the potential power 
of the images on juror’s opinions has influenced the work of lawyers as it plea-bargaining 
may be encouraged.  The ability of video surveillance images to encourage plea-
bargaining could decrease the number of cases that come before the courts, and less time 
and resources would be required to prosecute suspects.  
R. v. Nikolovski: The Influence of Video Surveillance Images on Case Law and the Courts 
 The Supreme Court of Canada in their ruling on R. v. Nikolovski stated that a 
judge is able to determine whether or not the accused is the person pictured in a 
surveillance image.  As opposed to an eyewitness statement about the identity of suspect: 
When a judge says that [the accused is the person pictured], we first of all 
don't hear the judge say that until the case is over. Because the judge 
doesn’t have to speak a word until all the evidence is in. You don't get to 
cross-examine the judge. You don't get to challenge the judge on what 
they think. You don't even get to argue that ‘you are wrong your honour, 
because look the height is different the weight is different, the facial 
features are different. Take a look at this.’ We don't get to do that. The 
judge delivers that in the courts judgment at the end. So there is no way to 
challenge that (Lawyer 3).  
 
This decision by the Supreme Court of Canada can influence both the decisions of the 
prosecution and the defence to proceed to trial, and also the accused person’s chance of 
acquittal.  A decision may be made to plea bargain in a case where there is not additional 
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evidence and the judge would be required to make a determination about the identity of 
the accused based on their viewing of the surveillance image.  Since psychological 
studies have demonstrated the unreliability of identification based upon surveillance 
images (see Henderson, Bruce and Burton, 2001; Davis and Valentine, 2008) there is a 
possibility that the accused will be misidentified.  However, this case law can also benefit 
a defence lawyer and their client.  If the video is detrimental to the Crown’s case against 
the accused the defence can argue Nikolovski by stating: “your honour, here's a judge 
who looked at the video and made the determination, that's the guy, you can do the same” 
(Lawyer 3).  This assists the defence lawyer by allowing the lawyer to encourage the 
judge to make such a determination in a case where the defence lawyer believes the judge 
will not identify the client as the person in the surveillance images.  This case 
demonstrates how the availability of surveillance images can influence a court case by 
allowing the judge to make a determination of identity.  This case law may also influence 
the accused in deciding whether or not to plea-bargain.  One lawyer expressed how R. v. 
Nikolovski increases the speed at which a case may be cleared due to plea-bargaining: 
 I recently did a case of a guy charged with some convenience store 
robberies. There were some photographic images that were taken of him 
and you show him the image and you say ‘do you think a judge is going to 
think this is you?’ And I think that it is a motivator in moving the case 
along… (Lawyer 4). 
 
The preceding quotations demonstrates how the surveillance image and Supreme Court 
decisions work in conjunction within the surveillant assemblage to influence the choices 
that lawyers and their clients make with respect to plea-bargaining or taking a case to 
trial. 
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 The lawyers who were interviewed did not show awareness of a British Columbia 
Court of Appeal ruling that allowed a re-trial based on the fact that the trial judge failed 
to allow the defence to make further submissions that would have called the quality or 
content of the image into question17.  R. v. Nikolovski allows the judge to make a 
determination of identity of the accused without being cross-examined by the defence, 
however, the defence still has the right to call image quality and content into question (R 
v. T.A.K., 2006).  This ruling, in upholding R. v. Nikolovski, may be beneficial to lawyers 
whose clients stand accused of a crime in which video surveillance evidence is available, 
but the quality of the evidence can instill reasonable doubt about a suspect’s guilt, 
upholding the right to a fair trial. 
Images versus Eyewitness Testimony 
 The surveillance image also influences the work of a lawyer because the lawyer 
does not have to rely on eyewitness testimony for a description of events.  Compared to 
having eyewitnesses “the thing that is nice about video is . . . you don't need five 
witnesses.  You only need the recording, if it is good enough, its slam-dunk” (Lawyer 1). 
The surveillance image, provided it is of good quality, may influence the case as the 
lawyer has additional evidence to rely on, in addition to or to contradict eyewitness 
testimony.  The surveillance image can be especially damaging to eyewitnesses’ 
statements if they do not know that the incident was captured on video surveillance.  One 
lawyer described multiple cases in which he had the eyewitness testify about the events 
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17 Although this case law and R. c. MacNeil (2008), see below, were not mentioned in the interviews it is 
possible that lawyers would attempt to locate and consult this information when defending a client captured 
in surveillance images. 
! &+!
on the stand18.  The lawyer then described to the witness a second account of the events.  
The eyewitness in each case contested the lawyer’s version of the events until the 
surveillance images were shown and demonstrated what the lawyer had just stated to the 
eyewitness was what was pictured in the surveillance images (Lawyer 3).  In these cases 
the growth of information provided by the surveillant assemblage, in particular video 
surveillance, has enabled the lawyer to represent the events using the surveillance images 
and to counter the testimony of the eyewitnesses and support his client’s claims.  
Context and Representation 
 As previously mentioned the image only provides basic information, that is, what 
the subject(s) of the image looked like at a given point in time.  To fully understand what 
is occurring in the images knowledge must be read into or applied to the image (see 
Phillips 1997: 29).  This knowledge provides context for what is shown in the video.  
Lawyers can use this to their advantage when preparing their case.  For example, one 
lawyer described a case where video surveillance showed his client in a location known 
to be an illegal gaming house19.  Although the lawyer could not argue that his client was 
not in the illegal gaming house, he could make claims about the level of involvement his 
client had in the activities, or that the activities were not games of luck, but rather skill 
(Lawyer 2).  Although the client was in the surveillance images, this contextualization 
allows the defence lawyer to mount a defence.  
 Relying on the surveillance image may create an appearance of knowing who the 
suspect is, however, the possibility of false accusations are possible since knowledge 
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18 One case involved surveillance images obtained from a business and the other case involved surveillance 
images from the booking area at a police service.  Despite the second images being from non-business 
video surveillance, both cases demonstrate how surveillance images can be defended against in court. 
19 Police carried out the covert video surveillance in this case.  However, this case still demonstrates how 
video surveillance can be defended against regardless of the party who implemented it. 
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from images is “knowledge at bargain prices – a semblance of knowledge, a semblance 
of wisdom…” (Sontag, 2001: 24).  Although one may believe that they know the identity 
of the person pictured, false accusations are possible.  In one case the police showed a 
surveillance image to a suspect’s parents who agreed that the image could pass as their 
child.  However, the parents stated that their child could not be the one pictured as he was 
at work.  When the police attended the suspect’s workplace they were able to clear the 
suspect due to surveillance images from his workplace that showed he was working at the 
time of the incidents (Police 6).  This example demonstrates the fallibility of the 
surveillance image and the information and knowledge attached to it and the inaccuracy 
of identification based solely upon video surveillance.  Had the suspect in this case not 
been cleared by a second source of video evidence that provided him with an alibi, the 
outcome of the case could have been significantly altered.  Since the suspects’ parents 
could make out their son in the image it is plausible that a judge, relying on the ruling in 
R. v. Nikolovski, would have made a similar false identification of the suspect.   
Digital Watermarks 
 Digital watermarks, information overlaid on an image or hidden on the data-file, 
are often produced on digital images.  These watermarks contain information such as the 
date and time the image was made or the camera the image was made from.  These 
watermarks may assist in determining the time the crime occurred but are not necessary 
for court presentation.  In a Nikolovski hearing of the Criminal Division of the Superior 
Court of Quebec surveillance images (i.e., video) that had the watermarks removed, due 
to the technical limitations of the system, could still be used as evidence since other 
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reference points to the time the video was captured (i.e., cellular phone records20, time 
reference on still images).  The Crown was not required to provide watermarked copies to 
meet its burden of proof (R. c. MacNeil, 2008).  This ruling has potential to influence all 
three institutions examined.  Businesses may not be required to shut down their systems 
while the police duplicate the hard drive to obtain a watermarked copy of the images.  
The police may not have to go through the time-consuming process of duplicating the 
hard drive, thus freeing up valuable police resources for other tasks.  Finally, defence 
lawyers may have one less way to call into question the authenticity of the video.  These 
influences may occur, however, as of the writing of this thesis, the influences of this 














20 This case also demonstrates how various methods of surveillance compose a ‘data-double’. 
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6. CONCLUSION  
 This research has contributed both theoretically and substantively to surveillance 
studies.  The research has examined the influence of surveillance images on businesses, 
police and the courts.  It has also contributed to the further understanding of the operation 
of the surveillant assemblage, including its expansion through function creep; the 
invocation of the precautionary logic, and the creation and use of data-doubles.  Through 
the investigation of the use of surveillance images by various institutions this research 
has helped to refine the orienting concept of the surveillant assemblage.  
 This research examined the influences of surveillance images on various 
institutions and found that the images do in fact influence the three institutions under 
study in various ways.  Businesses were found to use video surveillance to prevent loss.  
The use of video surveillance allowed businesses to set-up various ways to monitor for 
criminal or other unwanted behaviour and influenced how and whether labour was 
deployed to monitor these behaviours.  The use of video surveillance by businesses had a 
drastic impact on police practices.  Police services have undergone institutional 
restructuring in response to the increased amount of information being provided in the 
form of surveillance images.  The surveillance images have increased the workload of the 
police to the point where there is evidence of serious delays in the processing of images.  
Finally, the courts have been influenced by the availability of surveillance images.  The 
courts no longer have to rely solely on eyewitness testimony, as the surveillance image is 
able to illustrate the events that would have previously been described by eyewitnesses.  
The surveillance images may also reduce strain on the courts since accused persons may 
be encouraged to plea-bargain if they believe a judge or jury will identify them in the 
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surveillance images.  Future research should examine the influence of video surveillance 
on other institutional practices, for example the influence of surveillance images on 
settling insurance claims or in civil law cases.  
 The surveillant assemblage has expanded through the use of video.  However, this 
research has found that the expansion of the surveillant assemblage is more nuanced than 
originally proposed and that there are barriers to the expansion of the assemblage. The 
operation of the surveillant assemblage may be hindered because “there are hundreds of 
images every single day, it is almost like car alarms, that people start to tune out because 
they hear it so often” (Police 3).  Although the video surveillance is still capturing the 
images, the number of people surveying the information gathered from the video 
surveillance may not be as great as expected and needed to give meaning to the contents 
of the images.  Ironically the expansion of surveillance may lead to a decrease in the 
number of people paying a great deal of attention to the information created. The 
operation and expansion of the surveillant assemblage is slowed by the inability of 
institutions to effectively manage the amount of information that is produced. This 
research has demonstrated an expansion of the amount of data collected by video 
surveillance but it has also shown that an increase in the amount of information gathered 
does not always translate to an increase in the amount of information that can be 
processed.  
 Although the research originally sought to examine the influence of one 
technology (i.e., video surveillance and surveillance images) on three institutions (i.e., 
police, businesses and the courts) additional institutions were discovered operating in, or 
on the fringes of, the surveillant assemblage.  These institutions included the media who 
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receive video surveillance images from the police to gather tips from the public.  The 
public is also part of the surveillant assemblage when they begin to gather their own 
surveillance images to capture those committing crimes against personal property.  
Multiple levels of government influence the operation of the surveillant assemblage.  
Municipal government sets police budgets, which may impact how video surveillance 
images are processed.  The federal government is also enrolled in the assemblage through 
enacting laws that influence how video surveillance images are collected and stored.  
Each institution is enrolled in the surveillant assemblage in a different way.  Some 
institutions have a direct role in the surveillant assemblage, such as businesses that 
deploy and monitor the systems, whereas other institutions are enrolled in the assemblage 
only through their indirect influences.  The influences of various institutions on the 
surveillant assemblage should be explored in future research.  
 Surveillance images only come to represent persons and actions when institutional 
knowledge is applied to them.  The meaning of these images can be specific to the 
institution examining the images.  When institutional knowledge is applied to the image 
the meaning may change.  The surveillant assemblage is only able to function through the 
application of institutional knowledge to the information that is gathered.  Without 
human intervention the information cannot be transformed to inform institutional 
practices and perceptions of video surveillance.  Future research should closely examine 
other image transfer between institutions that obtain the surveillance images and how the 
meaning of surveillance images is transformed through the application of institutional 
knowledge.   
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 Consistent with Ericson’s (2007: 2) claim that institutions external to the police 
have the primary role of crime prevention, this research found that businesses have the 
primary responsibility for preventing crimes committed against their interests.  One way 
this is done is through the use of video surveillance.  As this research has shown, while 
businesses have the primary task of preventing crime, and use video surveillance in an 
attempt to accomplish this, when video surveillance fails to prevent crime it is the police 
who are given the job of using the images produced by the video surveillance to locate 
and charge a suspect.  The precautionary logic provides a rationale for video surveillance 
and as the video surveillance images are transferred from their point of creation (e.g., 
business) to external institutions the surveillant assemblage expands its reach. Future 
research should examine how relying on the precautionary logic to devise crime 
prevention methods influences institutions external to where crime prevention method is 
deployed. 
 Despite the adoption of video surveillance by businesses and the public the 
hierarchies of surveillance have not been completely leveled.  While video surveillance 
may implicate those with power (e.g., police misconduct), video surveillance is still 
primarily focused on those without it. Business initiated video surveillance may capture 
the conduct of those with power, for example police misconduct, however, video 
surveillance is primarily instituted to deter and detect street-level crime and to protect 
businesses from other losses (e.g., insurance fraud). While the surveillant assemblage is, 
in theory, capable of leveling social hierarchies, in practice, especially in relation to video 
surveillance, the surveillant assemblage has not been successful in accomplishing this 
! &(!
feat.  Future research should examine how other surveillance technologies are used to 
either maintain or disrupt the current social hierarchies. 
 The various surveillance image-informed institutional practices influence those 
whose data are captured in the images.  Those influenced include the police, victims and 
third parties (see above).  Future research should further examine these influences.  For 
example, research should examine individual police officers views on being subject to the 
scrutiny of video surveillance and other components of the surveillant assemblage (e.g., 
cell-phone cameras).  This research would provide a greater understanding of the 
influences of images on institutional practices and expand on the findings of the current 
research. 
 It is still perceived that video surveillance is an effective crime prevention and 
investigative tool.  However, as this research has shown, video surveillance often does 
not prevent crime, and the surveillance images may also not lead to the resolution of a 
case.  One reason the perceptions of video surveillance effectiveness may be perpetuated 
by popular culture representations of video surveillance as an effective crime prevention 
and investigative tool.  Further empirical evidence is needed to determine the exact 
reasons why these perceptions continue to exist in the absence of substantial evidence to 
support the effectiveness of video surveillance. 
 This research found that information from surveillance images is unique in its 
influence compared to other information used by the institutions for similar purposes.  
For example, the research found that compared to other evidence, surveillance images are 
unique as they are often more powerful then eyewitness statements or fingerprints in 
influencing those involved in the court process (see above).  Future research should 
! &)!
examine what other influences surveillance images have that differ from other 
information used by institutions. 
 Although it would be an impossible task for one research project to examine all 
the aspects of the surveillant assemblage it is possible to choose various aspects of 
surveillance to explore the connections within the assemblage.  Relying on the surveillant 
assemblage to inform surveillance studies allows the researcher to develop a greater 
understanding of particular aspects (e.g., technologies, institutions) while not ignoring the 
fact that surveillance is not isolated to particular locations.  While this research focused 
on a particular technology (i.e., video surveillance), the information that this technology 
creates (i.e., surveillance images) and three institutions (i.e., businesses, police and the 
courts), the surveillant assemblage entails a much greater range of technologies, 
information and institutions.  Future research should build upon the current refinements 
to the surveillant assemblage and explore how information from other surveillance 
technologies (e.g., biometrics, customer loyalty cards, etc.) influences institutional 
practices.  Moreover, future research should explore how other institutions, including 
those discussed but not thoroughly examined in this research (i.e., The Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner, the media) influence the practices of other institutions as it relates 
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Appendix A: Police Interview Schedule 
 
Could you provide some background on the use of CCTV images by your police service?  
Probe – how old is the video services unit, number of images processed, staff, etc. 
 




Do you work with businesses to develop video surveillance plans for crime prevention? 
Probe. 
 
How are the images collected with respect to evidence gathering practices? 
Probes: How is the image handled - recording of information, transferring to 
different media formats etc? 
 
Are there any differences between the handling of video evidence and other forms of 
forensic evidence (e.g. fingerprints)? 
Probe. 
 
What identifiers are used when pinpointing a suspect?  - clothes, face, walk, etc? 
Probe. 
 
What is required of the video to be admissible as evidence? 
Probes: Are there standards for date/time stamps?  
Length of video - is the act itself only required or is more context needed? 
 




Could you describe the flow of the video (or a particular case) through the court system - 
from being to recorded to being used in the case? 
Probe   Transfer of image to prosecution and defense. 
 
Do business practices related to CCTV images effect how you work with the image? 
Probe. 
 
Do the prosecution or defense make particular requests that  have any impact on how you 
process the images? 
Probe:  How do you work with the prosecutor and/or defense lawyers in 
compiling the video? 
 








Approximately how many images do you process, compared to how many make it to 
being presented in court cases? 
Probe. 
 
How long are images retained?  
Probe. 
 
What do the images generally identify - witness, suspect, victim etc - how is each 
different element helpful in creating the narrative of the case? 
Probe. 
 
What type of crimes do the images generally depict (murder cases, violence, theft, etc?)? 
Probe:  Does the type of crime affect how the video is prepared, transferred (e.g., 
to media)? 
 
Could you describe how the video evidence affects a case, compared to relying on 
eyewitness accounts?  
Probe. 
 
How has the availability of CCTV images affected police work? 
Probe (i.e., policy changes, personnel changes, technology changes)? 
 
What has been the biggest success of using CCTV images? 
Probe. 
 
What has been the biggest failure of using CCTV images? 
Probe. 
 








Clarify any additional issues raised during the interview. 
 





Appendix B: Court (Lawyer/Judge) Interview Schedule 
 
Could you describe the transfer of CCTV images and any special consideration that is 
given in the process of disclosure by police? 
Probe. 
 
Are there any requirements that you have for CCTV image presentation in court that 
affects the police processing of images or collection of images by private businesses? 
Probe. 
 
Have you seen a rise in the use of CCTV images? 
Probe. 
 
Do other institutions (i.e., businesses and police) effect your use of the CCTV image? 
Probe. 
 
What types of cases have you found involve CCTV evidence? 
Probe. 
 
What effect does the CCTV image have on your job? 
Probe. 
 
Does the CCTV image affect guilty pleas and plea-bargaining? 
Probe. 
 
Does the CCTV image appear to have any affect on juries?  
Probe (i.e., popular culture representations of the image) 
 
Does the vantage point or quality of the image play a role in the presentation and 
effectiveness of the CCTV image? 
Probe. 
 
Is there any case law/legislation that you are cognizant of when dealing with video 
evidence from surveillance cameras? 
Probe. 
 
Could you describe how the video evidence affects a prosecution and/or defense, 
compared to relying on eyewitness accounts?  
Probe. 
 
Are there any legal arguments against the inclusion of CCTV evidence in courts that have 
been tried, and are effective in discounting the evidence? 
Probe. 
 




What is your biggest failure in using CCTV images in court? 
Probe. 
 
Clarify any additional issues raised during the interview. 
 









































Appendix C: Business Interview Schedule 
 
Could you describe your businesses Closed-circuit television arrangement? 
Probe – technical aspects (i.e., digital, analog), monitoring, staffing. 
 
Are the cameras linked to any other monitoring software/hardware (special features i.e. 
cash transaction readout)? 
Probe. 
 
Could you describe the requirements for monitoring once a person of interest is 
identified? (Real-time monitoring only). 
Probe: Is there a need to continue monitoring the suspect until they leave the store 
to prove they have committed the crime?  Are the images used to support this, or is 
physical surveillance enough? 
 
Is there a need to produce the image in order to prove that a crime has occurred (non-real 
time monitoring)?  
Probe. 
 
Are log-books kept of suspicious activity/police contact/etc? 
Probe. 
 
What are the reasons behind implementing the system? 
Probe – changes over time. 
 
Does the system provide any cost savings? 
Probe (theft reduction, insurance) 
 
Are there any legal issues that are taken into consideration with regards to this security 
arrangement? 
 Do you have signage in place  (where, what)? 
 
What is the primary function of the cameras? 
Probe (employee theft, shoplifting, vandalism, etc.) 
 
Do all images captured of criminal behaviour get transferred to the police? 
Probe.  
 
Are there concerns about transferring images to the police, or conflicts that arise during 
transfer? 
Probe (i.e., no transfer due to violation on part of the business) 
 
Do the police or legal decisions have any impact on how you conduct CCTV monitoring? 
Probe. 
 
Could you describe the transfer process for me please? 
! '*!
Probe (DVD transfer, image print off, etc.) 
 
Do you retain a copy of the images/video that are transferred? 
Probe. 
 
What is done with those that are not transferred?  
Probe. 
 
Does your insurance provider outline specific guidelines for your CCTV use? 
Probe. 
 
Is there a push from outside agencies (i.e., police, courts, etc) to implement more cameras 
or improved systems? 
Probe. 
 
Do images get transferred to other institutions, such as your insurance agency, other 
businesses or the media? 
Probe. 
 
What role do you (or other loss prevention/security staff) play in court? 
Probe. 
Clarify any additional issues raised during the interview. 
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$ performing the project by qualified and appropriately trained personnel in accordance with REB 
protocol; 
$ implementing no changes to the REB approved protocol or consent form/statement without notification 
to the REB of the proposed changes and their subsequent approval of the REB; 
$ reporting promptly significant adverse effects to the REB within five (5) working days of occurrence; 
and 
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21 ‘CCTV’ is a system of surveillance, intended to prevent or respond to unwanted behaviour, that captures 
images and transfers these images over a closed-system (wired or wireless) to a centralized location where 
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.>9.C.93?;4A!?D0>2.04A!7-!6;?204P!I will retain the original audio recording (and a password 
protected copy of the recording on my hard drive, in my private residence) only as long as is 
necessary to review and verify the transcript during initial phases of analysis, and will not allow 
any other person to listen to the recording. No later than the end of the thesis defence, I will 
securely delete the recording, and will attach a statement verifying that the audio has been deleted 
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